If we assume that a society is operating in Nash equilibrium, then every individual is satisfied with his own strategy and life decisions. Any unilateral move by any individual is doomed to a reduction in his own well-being. The only way out from a Nash equilibrium that does not reduce the well-being of any member of society is a simultaneous move by multiple individuals and possibly by the complete society. The extent of required coordination depending on how interconnected the interests of members of society are. Maybe, it is for this reason that religious movements seem to start at the periphery. It is left of centre where one can find a group of people who are sufficiently disentangled from the web of society to actually try a different way; seeking out better conditions of cooperation.
From the point of view of a sage living in a society in Nash equilibrium, the difficult question as I said is coordination. How to convince members of society to effect the required changes in their individual decisions that lead to greater benefit to everyone when their present choices seem to be in their very best interest? This is the origin of social institutions.
Now, let us assume that somehow that society managed to escape Nash equilibrium and is operating at a Pareto efficient point. There is always the question of which Pareto efficient point should the society operate at. This is a vexing question, but some reasonable answers exist. Especially relevant is Rawls' difference principle. While I agree without any reservations to the difference principle, I find Rawls definition of primary goods to be unsatisfactory. Rawls fails to connect the primary goods with environmental resources. The main drawback of his philosophy (at least inasmuch as a Theory of Justice is concerned) is that he doesn't give enough weight to evolutionary selective pressure. Rawls is too interested in the rational to sufficiently consider our animal side.
Assuming that a suitable Pareto efficient point is chosen, we are left with the following dilemma. For an individual, there seems to always be a change in strategy that increases the well-being of that particular individual assuming everyone else's strategy remains the same. The difficulty of this issue is that the difference principle (or any other principle trying to devise guidelines as to which Pareto efficient point(s) are desirable) is that correct application is extremely difficult. As such, even among morally upstanding members of a well-ordered society who agree to Rawls principles of justice, one would expect considerable disagreement over the quantitative facts relating to how society is to conduct itself regarding the distribution of primary goods (whatever these are accepted to be). As such, some members of society might feel justified in their choice to change their strategy and upsetting the state of society.
A simple answer would be to declare all non-Pareto efficient moves unlawful. While this can stabilise Pareto efficient societies, it can lead to manifestly evil societal conditions. As Rawls, Sen, and others made clear, Pareto efficiency is not always consistent with justice. Outlawing non Pareto moves means legalising potential injustice.
An effective stabilising influence is social memory. So long as members of society remember the conditions under Nash equilibrium and understand that once one person departs from the just Pareto efficient strategy, the possibility of everyone else doing the same and descending back into the Nash equilibrium conditions, it can be safely assumed that they would generally refrain from any such departures even when such departures might be legally acceptable. An even stronger incentive not to be lured by evident individual gains is the extreme difficulty of constructing a just efficient society. When the memory of the struggles to reach a just efficient society are fresh in the memory of members of society, it is very unlikely that they would jeopardise the functioning of societal institutions for individual gains. Even when individuals feel that the state of society is unjust to a degree, they would be likely to bring their complaints to the open and address the sense of justice of their compatriots rather than take matters into their own hands and follow whatever policies that might promise an improvement of their well-being . Social memory can relieve a lot of pressure on legislation and obviates the need for excessive state intrusion into individual decisions.
Once social memory of the distant Nash equilibrium and the struggle to escape it fades, the deterrent of the social memory is weakened and it becomes more likely for individuals to engage in legally-acceptable, but destructive actions. In my view, this is a fairly good explanation of Omar's (RA) remark:
"The seams of Islam would be torn one by one as those grow up under Islam who are ignorant about Jahiliya (pre-Islamic state of affairs)"If my interpretation of this remark is true, a good definition of Jahiliya is deficient rationality. This definition is consistent with the Arabic word Jahl being the antonym of Hilm which is connected to Reason.
At least a minimal recognition of the importance of social memory by societal institutions is a requisite for the endurance of these institutions. It is important to note here that the function of social memory is not to create a foundational myth or a sense of group distinctiveness. In fact, once societal institutions start promoting the foundational events of society as emotional entity forming devices they lose all their benefits in stabilising society. It is the actual grit and toil of the founding group that deserves attention and not their victories and glories.
